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I. INTRODUCTION 
“Most taxes distort economic decision-making.”2 Taxes have long been used to influence 
the decision making of taxpayers. Using taxes to induce taxpayer actions may be effective; 
however, it also, regrettably, often results in distorting taxpayer behavior that subverts the original 
intention of the law. Whether the tax law should be used as a tool to provoke taxpayer behavior, if 
such use is effective or wise due to the inadvertent results is often debated. As one commentator 
noted regarding the tax incentives for historic tax provisions and the unintended consequences: 
 
 
Discussion of the role of tax policy in the preservation movement should be approached 
from the viewpoint that U.S. tax laws are fundamentally a mechanism for raising the revenue needed 
by the government and that this process should be carried out in a fair, rational and straightforward 
manner. Before complicating the system through the use of tax laws for other purposes – whether 
to regulate conduct or to achieve societal or economic objectives – one should first test the 
availability of alternative methods for achieving those non-revenue goals.3 
 
 
Scholarship has explored these unintended distortions, which sometimes conflict directly 
with Congressional intent, particularly with respect to corporate transactions. 4  The beauty of 
studying how tax law has resulted in distortions to architecture is that the study presents a visual 
representation of these distortions and makes such unintended consequences noticeable or even 
obvious to taxpayers. 
Adam Smith said it was clear a tax provision was bad if it encouraged evasion by 
taxpayers.5 He also said a tax was bad if it put taxpayers through “odious examinations of the tax-
gatherers, and expose[s] them to much unnecessary trouble, vexation and oppression.”6 
 
2 J. Anthony Coughlan, Land Value Taxation and Constitutional Uniformity, 7 Geo. Mason L. Rev. 261 
(1999). 
3 Mortimer Caplin, Federal Tax Policy as an Incentive for Enhancement of the Built Environment, in TAX 
INCENTIVES FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION 7 (G. Andrews ed. 1981). 
4 My previous scholarship focuses on unintended distortions caused by tax code provisions in the corporate 
tax context. See, e.g., Meredith Conway, Money, Money, Money; It’s a Rich Man’s World: Making the Corporate Tax 
Fair, 17 U. PENN. J. BUS. L. 1181 (2015) (discussing how high corporate tax rates and lower tax rates on partnership 
income unintendedly result in horizontal inequity); see also Meredith Conway, Stealth Inequity: Using Corporate 
Integration to Ease Unfairness in the Tax Code, 2 WM. & MARY POL’Y REV. 53 (2010) (describing how the accredited 
investor standard combined with the high corporate income tax rate compared to lower tax rates on partnership income 
unintendedly results in a higher tax burden on investments by lower income taxpayers); Meredith Conway, With or 
Without You: Debt, Equity and the Continuity of Interest, 15 STAN. J. L. BUS. & FIN. 261 (2010) (discussing that the 
tax distinctions between equity and debt unintentionally encourage taxpayers to design instruments to maximize 
efficient tax treatment in spite of corporate features of the instrument); Meredith Conway, Money for Nothing and the 
Stocks for Free: Taxing Executive Compensation, 17 CORNELL J. L. & PUB. POL'Y 383 (2008) (describing that the 
taxation of excess executive compensation results in executive stock options; resulting in  aggressive and imprudent 
decisions aimed to maximize stock prices); Meredith Conway, Clowns to the Left of Me, Jokers to the Right, Here I 
am, Stuck in the Middle with You: The Inconsistent Tax Treatment of Security Holders in Tax-Free Reorganizations, 
56 CATH. U.L. REV. 99 (2006) (arguing that the tax treatment of security holders results in inefficient superior tax 
benefits to holders of equities or debt and discourages long term investment through debt).  
5 5 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 561–564 (1776). 
6 Id; 2 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 309 (1776).  
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This Article presents a number of tax provisions that were enacted to raise revenue or 
influence taxpayer behavior, and resulted in modifying and warping architecture in terms of 
unexpected architectural design changes. Not only did these architectural design permutations 
spread within the taxing jurisdiction, but also caused enduring changes to architecture that 
dispersed into other countries as well as changes to longstanding architectural design principles.  
As mentioned earlier, architecture serves as a perfect visual illustration of these distortions, 
making these unintended effects and their influence accessible even to those not well-versed in tax 
law. Often, taxes that are enacted to encourage or discourage a certain behavior result in distorting 
taxpayer behavior in unanticipated ways. Legislatures enacting tax laws to induce actions or even 
raise revenue will often inadvertently distort taxpayer behavior as taxpayers seek to minimize their 
tax burden.7 Tax avoidance, which involves taxpayers seeking to lower or avoid taxes, is legal, as 
opposed to tax evasion which is illegal.8 A popular statement of their distinction is as follows:  
 
 
“The man who deliberately adopts one of several possible courses, because that one will 
save him the most tax, must be distinguished from the man who does the same but for entirely 
different reasons. A tax avoidance transaction is one which would not be adopted if the tax-saving 
element had not been present.”9  
 
 
A legislature enacting taxes must balance the burden imposed by the tax against possible 
actions taxpayers might take to avoid the increased tax burden, the taxpayer’s cost and 
inconvenience of avoiding the tax, and finally the possibility of any unintended distortion to 
taxpayer behaviors. 10 Taxpayers’ attempts to avoid taxes result in not just behavioral (or, in the 
context of this Article, architectural) distortions, but also in outright brutality historically. In the 
seventeenth century, French objectors killed a teenage clerk who merely kept the books for a 
collector of taxes, nailing his flesh to doors to caution revenue officials of the dangers that awaited 
them.11 
One of the reasons tax authorities deliberately taxed certain items was an attempt to reach 
a specific demographic. Legislatures often advocated for taxes that would reach the wealthy and 
impose a lesser burden on the poor. To achieve this, rather than just tax the wealth, legislatures 
 
7 See G.S.A. Wheatcroft, The Attitude of the Legislature and the Courts to Tax Avoidance, 18 MOD. L. REV. 
209, 209–210 (1955) (citing examples such as alcohol taxes to reduce drunkenness, additional profits tax to avoid 
dividends, and in particular the strategy of purchasing insolvent companies to absorb future profits and reflecting that 
the bidding prices increased while the owner of the company emphasizes how significantly insolvent the company is 
to raise prices).  
8 See id. (the author defines tax avoidance as “a transaction that (a) avoids tax, (b) is entered into for the 
purpose of avoiding tax, (c) is carried out lawfully, and (d) is not a transaction with the legislature has intended to 
encourage”). 
9 Id. 
10 See id. at 210.  
11 See CHARLES ADAMS, FOR GOOD AND EVIL: THE IMPACT OF TAXES ON THE COURSE OF CIVILIZATION 229 
(2001) (describing how the French would not accept taxes and would routinely respond with murder, mayhem and 
violence). 
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would tax items they thought served as a proxy for wealth – items reflecting “opulent living.”12 
For example, tax authorities have targeted wallpaper, windows, pocket watches, bricks and more.13 
As this Article will demonstrate, with respect to the architectural aspects, each resulted in 
paradoxical results, changing the face of architecture rather than serving as a tax on the items. 
As this Article will demonstrate, the unintended effects that taxes can have on architecture 
become part of the architectural landscape as the underlying tax avoidance strategies are identified 
and utilized by others, and as the designs gain independent popularity.14 The legislative intent may 
have been well-meaning; however, targeting specific architectural aspects for taxation often results 
in both arbitrary taxation and unintended consequences such as altered architecture style. Using 
arbitrary measures such as rooflines or materials as a proxy for wealth may not effectively target 
wealth. Further, “Architecture-based” taxation also interferes often with a taxpayer’s ability to pay. 
These issues violate the first two canons of Adam Smith: first, taxing individuals on their ability 
to pay; and second, ensuring the taxes are not arbitrary.15  
This Article proceeds in ten parts: Part I is an introduction of architectural changes due to 
tax policy; Part II explains the basic framework of taxing real estate and architecture; Part III 
discusses the Hearth/Chimney Tax; Part IV discusses the Window Tax; Part V discusses various 
tax laws that have led to distinctive architecture styles; Part VI focuses on tax laws that have 
created a particular architecture style: drastically narrow houses; Part VII focuses on tax laws in a 
particular period, colonial America, and their influence on architecture styles of the period; Part 
VIII gives a brief introduction to the distinction between land and building taxes and examples of  
architecture styles that result from tax policies targeting buildings instead of land; Part IX describes 
unintended architectural changes created by tax policy that intends to subsidize environmental 
conservation and protection efforts; and Part X concludes that architecture provides a meaningful 
and tangible illustration of the way tax laws can distort taxpayer behavior in unintended and 
significant ways. 
II. JUSTIFICATIONS FOR TAXING REAL ESTATE AND ARCHITECTURE 
  In addition to influencing taxpayer behaviors, property tax is one of several tools to raise 
revenue for local governments.16 Because real property is clearly visible and can often be assessed 
from the street, a property tax is often seen as a less intrusive, more objective and transparent tax. 
Adam Smith noted that “[i]t is easy to lay a tax upon land, because it is evident what quantity 
everyone possesses, but it is very difficult to lay a tax upon stock or money without very arbitrary 
proceedings [and] a hardship upon a man in trade to oblige him to show his books.”17 Land taxes 
were in use long before income taxes, principally because taxpayers objected to the intrusion in 
their privacy associated with income taxes. As mentioned earlier, a significant advantage of land 
 
12 See ISAAC WILLIAM MARTIN, THE PERMANENT TAX REVOLT: HOW THE PROPERTY TAX TRANSFORMED 
AMERICAN POLITICS 151 (2008). 
13 See id. 
14 See Wheatcroft, supra note 7, at 213. 
15 See 2 ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 307–308 (1776). 
16 See Joan M. Youngman & Jane H. Malme, An International Survey of Taxes on Land and Buildings, 
LINCOLN LAND INSTITUTE AND OECD 2 (1994).  
17 See SMITH, supra note 5, at 442. 
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taxes was that accessors could avoid interacting with the owners of the property, for example, by 
determining the value of such land as a base for tax from observations made while standing on the 
sidewalk. This was particularly helpful at times of great hostility toward taxes and tax accessors. 
Because of its frequent use, property taxes influenced how taxpayers held their properties 
at least as far back to as the Roman times. During the time of Diocletian’s new order, Emperor 
Diocletian enacted a tax based on the number of acres a farmer owned in Syria.18 In response, 
“[f]armers started to abandon their farms if they did not like their classification. The new system 
was endangered by the fundamental right of all Roman citizens to move about the Empire as they 
pleased.”19 Farmers were also reluctant to stay because their tax burden was unpredictable as it 
was determined year to year every September.20 
 In addition to unintended consequences, taxes on buildings and land were also used 
intentionally to influence taxpayer behaviors by creating incentives or disincentives for desired 
outcomes.21 Modern examples, which are discussed in greater details later, include tax credits for 
environmentally friendly buildings and for preservation of historic sites.22 
 A criticism of real property taxes is that a taxpayer’s wealth in land or buildings does not 
necessarily coincide with his or her ability to pay since it does not reflect the taxpayer’s asset 
liquidity.23 Consequently, a real property tax could force sales or foreclosures of the property. 
Historically, the property tax was also attacked for lack of horizontal equity, i.e., taxing wealth in 
the form of real property but omit wealth such as cash, stock, and bonds.24  
 Another criticism is that assessors could be motivated to value their assessments in a way 
to serve their own advantages.25 The valuation standards employed by assessors could be highly 
subjective, leading to unequal and inconsistent applications. These inconsistencies were 
particularly concerning when motivated by political favors or outright bribes.26 In addition, the 
difference between the respective abilities of personal and real property owners to circumvent 
taxes imposed on their properties led to further inequity. For example, colonial farmers would 
drive their livestock into the forest when assessors came to conceal their wealth and avoid taxes.27 
 
18 See ADAMS, supra note 11, at 114–115. 
19 Id. (traditionally, Roman farmers enjoyed the freedom of movement within the empire, but the land tax 
introduced by Emperor Diocletian forced them to remain in one place, altering the long-established precedent). 
20 See id. at 116–17 (delinquency was also not an option—the farmer faced the possibility that soldiers would 
plunder her land and torture or sell her children into slavery if she did not pay the tax). 
21 See Comment, Municipal Real Estate Taxation as an Incentive for Community Planning, 57 YALE L.J. 
219, 220 (1947) (describing how property taxes can be “an instrument to facilitate the realization of such desirable 
objectives such as the minimization of land speculation, the abolition of slums, the encouragement of new residential 
and business construction”)  
22 See Part IX, infra. 
23 See Youngman & Halman, supra note 16, at 2; see also MARTIN, supra note 12, at 6667. 
24 See Youngman & Halman, supra note 16, at 3. 
25 See MARTIN, supra note 16, at 6667.   
26 See id. 
27 See ROBERT A. BECKER, REVOLUTION, REFORM AND THE POLITICS OF AMERICAN TAXATION, 1763–1783 
8 (1980).  
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The real property, however, was much more difficult to hide..28 As Professor Isaac William Martin 
notes, the “system was unfair to property owners who lived in the wrong neighborhood.”29 
III. THE HEARTH/CHIMNEY TAX 
A. Byzantine Empire 
The first known hearth (i.e., fireplace) tax was imposed by the Byzantine empire in the 
seventh century, although few details are known about the tax. 30  It was called the kapikon 
(translated into the “smoke tax”).31 It was imposed on each household, as a proxy for families, 
based on the number of fireplaces in a municipality.32 Orphanages, hospitals, as well as monastic 
and religious institutions were exempt from the tax, but there was no exemption for the poor or 
indigent.33 As a result of the exemption for monasteries, families created monasteries to avoid 
paying the tax and the amount of monasteries grew dramatically, as many private individuals began 
monasteries to deliberately avoid paying the tax.34 The Byzantine hearth tax replaced the Roman 
head tax.35 It appears there was also a land tax at the time, but separate inspectors were used for 
the land tax and for the hearth tax.36 
B. French Hearth Tax 
 The French also had a hearth tax (also referred to as the fourage). It played a more 
significant role in France although there were similar versions of the tax in nearby countries like 
England.37 Historically, the French population had significantly less active role and participation 
in the enactment and imposition of taxes than the citizens in England.38 The French hearth tax was 
first imposed in 1146.39 It was used for the first time successfully as a source of revenue by Phillip 
the Fair in 1294.40 While the tax did not generate enough revenue to become part of the general 
tax structure until much later in history, it was the most direct tax France had until the late 14th 
century. Although the tax was briefly abolished by Charles V on his deathbed in 1380, it continued 
to play a role at various times during French history.41  
 
28 See id. 
29 See MARTIN, supra note 12.  
30 See JOHN F. HALDON, BYZANTIUM IN THE SEVENTH CENTURY: THE TRANSFORMATION OF A CULTURE 149 
(1997); see also Charles M. Brand, Two Byzantine Treatises on Taxation, 25 TRADITIO 35, 41 (1969); W. Ashburner, 
A Byzantine Treatise on Taxation, 35 J. HELLENIC STUD. 121–123 (1915). 
31 See HALDON, supra note 30. 
32 See id. 
33 See id. at 112–113. 
34 See id. at 293. 
35 See Brand, supra note 30, at 41.  
36 See Ashburner, supra note 30, at 76–78, 121–123. 
37 See JAMES COLLINS, THE STATE IN EARLY MODERN FRANCE 16, 111 (1995); see also 14(4) YORAM 
BARZEL & EDGAR KISER, TAXATION AND VOTING RIGHTS IN MEDIEVAL ENGLAND AND FRANCE, RATIONALITY AND 
SOCIETY COPYRIGHT 8, 494 (2002). 
38 See BARZEL supra note 37,  at 494. 
39 See id. 
40 See id.  
41 See COLLINS, supra note 37, at 111. 
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After Napoleon rose to power, the popular view among French citizens was that many taxes 
should be overthrown.42 To raise revenue, Napoleon chose to impose the hearth tax rather than a 
more intrusive poll tax or income tax.43 As Napoleon conquered countries, such as Italy and 
Netherlands, he removed local tax exemptions, including those for the poor, and imposed 
significant taxes, including a hearth tax, in order to fund his military operations.44 Commentators 
state that he essentially destroyed the Kingdom of Westphalia with a heavy tax burden.45 The 
hearth tax caused significant resentment among the French population during the time of 
Napoleon.46 But as French taxpayers gained more and more voting rights on the enactment of new 
taxes,47 the hearth tax was confirmed several times by national voting assemblies.48  
C. The Netherlands 
In Denmark, the government decreed that all hearths had to have chimneys.49 An important 
purpose of this rule is to allow tax collectors to count the number of hearths without entering the 
home and instead by counting the number of chimneys.50 To avoid this new chimney law, many 
Denmark farmers would gather all of the hearths together in one black kitchen.51 This would allow 
them to use a single chimney for all of the hearths, frustrating the tax collectors’ attempts to count 
the correct number of hearths.52 
D. British Hearth Tax 
The Hearth Tax was introduced in England from 1662 to1666 and then again from 1669 to 
1674 after Charles II was put on the throne.53  The hearth tax was intended to be a tax on wealth, 
using the number of fireplaces and chimneys that a household has as a proxy for the household’s 
 
42 See 3 STEPHEN DOWELL, A HISTORY OF TAXATION AND TAXES IN ENGLAND FROM THE EARLIEST OF TIMES 
TO THE YEAR 1885 153 (1888). 
43 See ADAMS, supra note 11, at 351. 
44 See MOSHEH TSUḲERMAN, ETHNIZITÄT, MODERNE UND ENTTRADITIONALISIERUNG 400 (2002) (explaining 




[https://perma.cc/D5G9-9PXA]; see also HOLGER NEHRING & FLRIAN SCHUI, GLOBAL DEBATES ABOUT TAXATION 62-
63 (2007). 
45 See NEHRING & SCHUI, supra note 44, at 62-63 (2007). 
46 See PHILIP G. DWYER, NAPOLEON AND EUROPE 173 (2014). 
47 See BRAZEL, supra note 37, at 494.  
48 See id. at 495. 
49 See ALLEN NOBLE, TRADITIONAL BUILDINGS: A GLOBAL SURVEY OF STRUCTURAL FORMS AND CULTURAL 
FUNCTIONS 31 (2009). 
50 See id. 
51 See id. 
52 See id. 
53  See Hearth Money Act (1663), 15 Car. 2, c. 13, § 1. A subsequent Act was passed, see Hearth Money Act 
(1664), 16 Car. 2, c. 3, §1, to enable official collection of the tax. It was later abolished, in Hearth Money Act (1688), 
1 W. & M., c. 10. See also DOWELL, supra note 42, at 258. 
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wealth.54 Each fireplace was taxed at two shillings.55 Unlike other property taxes in England, the 
tax on hearths required tax accessors to actually enter the home to determine the number of 
fireplaces since a visual inspection of chimneys from the outside would not accurately reflect the 
number of working fireplaces in a dwelling.56 The tax assessors who examined the homes were 
called “chimney men.”57  
The hearth tax was very unpopular and many taxpayers took measures to avoid paying the 
tax. One common method to avoid the tax was boarding up or blocking their chimneys which 
prevented the chimneys from being counted as working hearths. 58  Occasionally, devastating 
consequences resulted from blocking up a chimney. For example, in Churchill Oxfordshire, on 
July 3, 1684, a fire was caused by a baker who blocked her chimney to avoid the hearth tax.59 She 
knocked a hole through the wall from her oven to her neighbor’s chimney to use her neighbor’s 
chimney.60 The fire destroyed 20 houses and other buildings, and killed four people.61 The village 
was rebuilt higher up the hill, with stone houses instead of the old timber-framed and thatched 
cottages.62  
The hearth tax was abolished after the 1688 Glorious Revolution when a report referred to 
the tax as “ a badge of slavery upon whole people, exposing every man’s house to be entered and 
searched at the pleasure of persons unknown to him.”63 On a lighter note, Rebecca Rogers, who 
died August 22, 1668, had her tombstone inscribed “A house she hath, its made of such good 
fashion, the tenant ne’er shall pay for reparation nor will her landlord ever raise her rent or turn 
her out of doors for non-payment from chimney money too this cell is free of such a house who 
would not tenant be.”64 
E. Ireland 
The Irish also were subject to the hearth tax imposed by Great Britain after 1793.65 The tax 
applied to households having only one hearth, which are typically poorer taxpayers. To make the 
tax more like a wealth-based tax, the rates applicable to households with multiple hearths were 
later raised above those applicable to single hearth household.66 Eventually, in 1795, an exemption 
 
54 See INST.OF HISTORICAL RESEARCH, UNIVERSITY OF LONDON, LONDON AND MIDDLESEX HEARTH TAX 
(1666): AN ANALYSIS OF THE STATUS AND WEALTH OF NEIGHBORHOODS AND HOUSEHOLDS ON THE EVE OF THE 
GREAT FIRE, https://www.history.ac.uk/projects/research/hearth-tax. 
55 See DOWELL, supra note 42, at 153; see also ADAMS, supra note 11, at 351. 
56 See ADAMS, supra note 11, at 258. 
57 See id. (“There is not one old dame in ten, and search the nation through. But, if you talk of chimney-men 
will spare them a curse or two.”); see also DOWELL, supra note 42, at 39. 
58 See DOWELL, supra note 42, at 169; see also PAUL SULLIVAN, THE LITTLE BOOK OF OXFORDSHIRE 38 
(2012). 
59 See SULLIVAN, supra note 58, at 38.  
60 See id. 
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 DOWELL, supra note 42, at 40. 
64 MIKE HANAGAN & PAT COX, LEGENDS OF KENT 72 (2012). 
65 See D. Dickson, Taxation and Disaffection in Late Eighteenth-Century Ireland, in SAMUEL CLARK & 
JAMES DONNELLY, IRISH PEASANTS: VIOLENCE AND POLITICAL UNREST, 1780-1914, 45 (1983). 
66 See id. at 45. 
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for all one hearth households was enacted to lessen the burden on the poor.67 It was observed that 
some homes in Ireland were built entirely without chimneys to avoid the tax68 
Due to the unpopular nature of the hearth tax, many immigrants to the United States, 
especially those from France and Germany, strongly opposed any hearth tax.69 The distrust for 
hearth tax also led to a distrust for general property taxes later in the United States.70 
F. New Orleans Chimney Tax 
New Orleans has had an intriguing discourse over property and architectural taxes. Some 
have speculated that at one time, there was a door tax, incentivizing citizens to create floor to 
ceiling windows that would not be counted as doors.71 Others have speculated that the “shotgun 
house” which became a standard in New Orleans architecture is a tax-avoidance strategy against 
a tax on the frontage of buildings.72 The Spanish Chimney Tax of 1794 imposed a version of the 
historical hearth tax to raise fund for street lights.73 The tax was so unpopular that it only lasted 
for six months and was replaced with a tax on bread.74 In addition to raising revenue, the chimney 
tax was also an attempt to reduce fire risks (by taxing chimneys as a proxy to fireplaces which tend 
to impose such risks), in response to the great fires in 1788 and 1794, which destroyed 856 
buildings out of approximately 1100.75 As a typical tax avoidance strategy against such tax, 
households in the city of New Orleans started to share chimneys without necessarily reducing the 
number of fireplaces.76 
IV. THE WINDOW TAX 
A. The Window Tax of Great Britain 
A tax on windows (the “windows tax”) was imposed in England on inhabited 
dwellings based on the number of windows in the house.77 It was initially introduced in England 
 
67 See id. at 46. 
68 See A Business Man on Taxes, in TAX FACTS - PUBLISHED IN THE INTERESTS OF SOUND ECONOMICS AND 
AMERICAN IDEALS 29, 31 (Dec. 1992 ed.) (noting taxes that deliberately targets an industry may cripple an industry). 
69 See ADAM, supra note 11 at 326 (German Citizens in particular despised hearth taxes that had been imposed 
in their former homeland and were unwilling to be subjected to them again); see also PAUL NEWMAN, FRIES’S 
REBELLION: THE ENDURING STRUGGLE FOR THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 20, 20-21 (2004). 
70 See Centre for Hearth Tax Research, UNIVERSITY OF ROEHAMPTON, https://gams.uni-graz.at/context:htx; 
see also NEWMAN, supra note 69, at 20. 
71 See Robert Cangelosi, Why Do Older New Orleans Houses Have So Few Closets, 46:2 PRESERVATION IN 
PRINT, 36 (Mar. 2019). 
72 See Robert Ross & Deanne Ross, Walking to New Orleans: Ethics and the Concept of Participatory 
Design, in POST- DISASTER RECONSTRUCTION 408 (2008); RICHARD CAMPANELLA, CITYSCAPES OF NEW ORLEANS 90 
(2017). 
73 See LAWRENCE POWELL, THE NEW ORLEANS OF GEORGE WASHINGTON CABLE: THE 1887 CENSUS OFFICE 
REPORT 58 (2008). 
74 See id. 
75 See id. 
76 See id. 
77 See Window Duties Act (1747), 21 Geo. 2, c.10 [hereinafter The British Window Tax Act]; see also 
ADAMS, supra note 11, at 259; DOWELL, supra note 42, at 154; Wallace E. Oates & Robert M. Schwab, The Window 
Tax: A Transparent Case of Excess Burden, in LAND LINES, LINCOLN INSTITUTE OF LAND POLICY 11 (Apr. 2014). 
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and Wales in 1696 and was eventually repealed in 1851.78 In addition to taxing windows on the 
dwelling itself, the window tax also taxed windows on certain side buildings that served living 
purposes, like laundry houses.79 There were exemptions for those in poverty, certain outbuildings 
including dairies, cheese rooms and millhouses provided that they were labeled as such.80 Many 
of these labels still remain in some rooms carved on the lintel.81 There were many unintended 
architectural changes as a result of the tax on windows, including bricked over windows, fewer 
windows, and false painted windows. The goal of the window tax was to tax the wealthy, under 
the assumption that the wealthier someone is, the more windows in his or her house.82 The window 
tax also led to profound architectural changes evidenced in contemporary designs and extended 
beyond Great Britain to influence other countries including the United States.83 
Prior to the imposition of the window tax, wealthier citizens in England often had many 
windows to display and flaunt their prosperity.84 The most prestigious households in England had 
entire porches or alcoves surrounded by windows, creating a glass wall.85  The initial window tax 
in Great Britain imposed a flat-rate house tax of 2 shillings per window, with an additional tax for 
homes with more than ten windows and up to 20 windows of an extra 4 shillings.86 
A significant benefit to the window tax was that it was relatively easy to assess and collect 
because windows are clearly visible from the street.87 Assessment was generally unobtrusive since 
there was no need to interact with taxpayers or go inside homes.88 
 Adam Smith suggested that a window tax was better than a hearth tax because “windows 
are visible markers of wealth and would thus not require the tax collector to enter the taxpayer’s 
home.”89 It was suggested that the tax could discourage “wealth imposters” (social climbers) from 
purchasing excess windows to create the false impression that they were wealthy by taxing such 
behaviors.90 The window tax could serve to “restore the honours and distinctions of this sort, due 
to our nobility, gentry, merchants and others of real ability . . . .”91 “The laws would, in some 
 
78 The Bank of England Act (1696), 8 & 9 Will 3, c. 20. 
79 See M. HUMBERSTON, THE ABSURDITY AND INJUSTICE OF THE WINDOW TAX, CONSIDERED WITH ESPECIAL 
REFERENCE TO THE NEW SURVEY 8 (1841).  
80 See DOWELL, supra note 42, at 173-174. 
81 See id; see also Asshof Likhovski, Chasing Ghosts: On Writing Cultural Histories of Tax Law, 1 UC 
IRVINE L. REV. 843, 878 (2011). 
82 See M. HUMBERSTON, supra note 79, at 6. see also Likhovski, supra note 81, at 875; The British Window 
Tax Act, supra note 77; see also ADAMS, supra note 11, at 259. 
83 See Andrew E. Glantz, A Tax on Light and Air: Impact on the Window Duty on Tax Administration and 
Architecture, 1696-1851, 15(2) PENN HIST. REV. 18, 28 (2008). 
84  See STEPHEN ESKILSON, THE AGE OF GLASS: A CULTURAL HISTORY OF GLASS IN MODERN AND 
CONTEMPORARY ARCHITECTURE 4 (2018); see also CHANTAL STEBBINGS, THE VICTORIAN TAXPAYER AND THE LAW, 
A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL CONFLICT 5, 29 (2012) (noting that “wealth was perceived as an indication of moral 
worth”). 
85 See ESKILSON, supra note 84, at 4; see also Oates, supra note 77, at 13-14. 
86 The British Window Tax Act, supra note 77; see also Oates, supra note 77, at 13.  
87 See DOWELL, supra note 42, at 153-154; see also ADAMS, supra note 11, at 259. 
88 See NEWMAN, supra note 69, at 20-21; The British Window Tax Act, supra note 77; ESKILSON, supra note 
84, at 3. 
89 Likhovski, supra note 81, at 879; see also SMITH, supra note 5, at 239-240, 845-46. 
90 Id. at 885-895. 
91 Id. at 886.  
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measure, confine people to the practice of frugality, and take it out of their power to spend their 
substance in vainly mimicking their superiors.”92 The irony, however, is that even the wealthy 
began to brick over their windows to avoid the tax, thus making the (false) appearance of wealth 
even easier.93 
One aspect of the window tax that made it significantly more palatable to the British 
citizens was that, unlike an income tax, the window tax was imposed on “visible objects.”94 The 
assessment of a window tax, like that of a general property tax, typically would not involve an 
invasive inquisition into the taxpayer’s financial affairs or privacy.95  
In addition, the window tax was viewed as an objective tax, not subject to favoritism or 
judgment calls.96 The number of windows each building has is not affected by the subjective 
judgment of the tax collector.97 Further, the tax on windows was in some respects viewed as a 
voluntary tax because a taxpayer could choose to avoid the tax by eschewing windows.98 However, 
it was not easy or in many cases possible for the poor to avoid the tax by moving to homes with 
less windows, and therefore the tax could unfairly burden less wealthy taxpayers.99 
Despite the possible advantages of the window tax as compared to an income tax, the tax 
was still unpopular. It became known as a tax on "light and air."100 Since the number of windows 
in a dwelling was not an accurate measurement of the wealth of its occupants, for example, old, 
low-value houses inhabited by the poor but nonetheless having many windows, using windows as 
a proxy for wealth could capture taxpayers who were not actually wealthy, for example, those who 
inhabited old houses with many windows or those who installed more windows because they liked 
natural light and air.101 One commentator noted that, at the time of its enactment, the window tax 
“can no more be depended on [as a proxy for wealth] than the buttons of a coat can be said to 
denote its value.”102 As a previous example indicates, large houses with many windows may be 
owned in earlier times by the wealthy, but now often served as homes for the poor as the wealthy 
moved on to newer and grander houses.103 Some also argued that the window tax was a regressive 
tax, imposing a greater burden on the middle and lower classes.104   
 
92 See id.  
93 See id. at 878. 
94 See id. 
95 Id.  
96 See MARTIN, supra note 12, at 6-7 (arguing that fractional property taxes are subjective and cause unrest 
in many states within the Unites States because of the perception that they are not impartial and involve favoritism).  
97 See id. 
98 See id.; see also STEBBINGS, supra note 84, at 12 (noting that when England enacted an income tax it 
reflected “ideological adherence to voluntarism.”); see also ADAMS, supra note 11, at 397. 
99 See HUMBERSTON, supra note 79, at 14; see also Chantal Stebbings, The Impact of Tax on the Landscape: 
Social Expectations and the Built Environment in Nineteenth-Century England, in CHALLENGES TO AUTHORITY AND 
THE RECOGNITION OF RIGHTS: FROM MAGNA CARTA TO MODERNITY 183 (Catherine MacMillan & Charlotte Smith 
eds., 2018). 
100 See HUMBERSTON, supra note 79, at 23. 
101 See id. at 8. 
102 Id. 
103 See id. at 9; see also Oates, supra note 77, at 12-13. 
104 See HUMBERSTON, supra note 79, at 23. 
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Unsurprisingly, after the window tax was imposed, entire blocks of houses were built 
without windows.105 Such tax-avoidance strategy reduced revenue collected by the government 
and dramatically affected the window industry.106 In 1718 it was noted that there was a decline in 
revenue raised by the window tax because English citizens were blocking their windows to avoid 
the tax.107 One manufacturer stated that the window tax was far more injurious to his business than 
the glass excise tax because of the significant reduction in the demand for windows from 
consumers.108 
 Furthermore, taxpayers would build separate structures on the property in order to exempt 
those portions used for commercial purposes (thus not counted as part of the dwelling) from the 
window tax.109 The government response to this new trend was to extend the window tax to all 
buildings, commercial or not, thus extending its impact to industries in addition to the window 
industry.110 As evidence of the impact of the tax, glass production in England remained stagnant 
from 1810 to 1850 despite significant population growth and many more houses being built.111 
Since glass manufacturers played an important role in Great Britain’s market economy, some 
called the window tax a “grievous tax on the industry.”112 
Another response of the government was to expand the definition of “window” for window 
tax purposes, such as treating any hole in a wall as a “window” subject to the tax.113 One critic 
noted that under this tax even “the air holes and wire gratings in our cellars and larders” might be 
taxed as windows.114 The reduced number of windows on buildings were also potentially harmful 
to the health of its occupants.115 
The window tax also resulted in several distinct architectural changes which spread 
throughout England and beyond as the changes became fashionable.116 Bricked over windows and 
fake windows became so stylish that new construction included them for stylistic purposes.117 
Such “ghost windows” or “blind windows” can still be found in buildings today. 118  The 
architectural design of new buildings was further modified because bay windows often became 
prohibitively expensive, leading to flat fronted buildings; making the architecture of many areas 
 
105 See STEBBINGS, supra note 84, at 183. 
106 See id.; see also Oates, supra note 77, at 11-12. 
107 See DOWELL, supra note 42, at 171; see also ESKILSON, supra note 84, at 4. 
108 T.C BARKER & J.R. HARRIS, A MERSEYSIDE TOWN IN THE INDUSTRIAL REVOLUTION: ST HELENS 1750-
1900 215 (2012). 
109 See Glantz, supra note 83, at 30. 
110 See id. 
111 Id. 
112 ROBERT MONTGOMERY MARTIN, TAXATION OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 68, 91 (1833); see also ESKILSON, 
supra note 84, at 4 (noting that combined with the glass excise tax, taxes on glass had essentially more than doubled); 
182 HANSARD’S: THE PARLIAMENTARY DEBATES FROM YEAR 1803 TO THE PRESENT TIME 170 (1851) (including a 
Parliamentary debate where a member was unwilling to vote for the tax because of its burdens on many industries). 
113 See DOWELL, supra note 42, at 176. 
114 See M. HUMBERSTON, supra note 79, at 10 (noting that a lack of windows leads to health risks such as 
typhus). 
115 Id. 
116 See Glantz, supra note 83, at 28. 
117 See Stebbings, supra note 99, at 191; see also Glantz, supra note 83, at 31. 
118 See Glantz, supra note 83, at 28. 
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lacking character.119 Architects struggled to a great extent to design palatable buildings with the 
window size and number restrictions imposed by the British government.120 
Many observers objected to the perceived damage that the window tax was causing to the 
architectural landscape of Great Britain, claiming that “the visual impact of the legislation . . . and 
that the lack of engagement by the architectural associations was striking.”121  
 The window tax was incorporated into a larger tax bill in 1798 under the Triple Assessment, 
which imposes taxes on windows, servants, carriages, lights, clocks, watches and luxury goods.122 
Unsurprisingly, the Triple Assessment tax was very unpopular and failed to raise the revenue 
required to fund the war with France, which eventually led to Great Britain enacting its first income 
tax.123 Coincidence or not, the all glass Crystal Palace opened in 1851, the same year that the 
window tax was repealed.124  
Today, bricked up windows can still be seen frequently in Great Britain and are often used 
in countries including the United States to convey a historical look on new buildings.125 
B. The British Window Tax and Separate Buildings  
The British window tax altered architecture further than less windows being used in 
architectural design; it also resulted in the use of separate buildings on a homestead, for example, 
as work facilities, in addition to the primary dwelling. Since the tax was initially imposed only on 
primary dwellings, those separate buildings not used as primary dwelling were not subject to tax.126 
This architectural innovation successfully reduced the taxpayers’ tax burden on the work facilities 
they separated from the dwelling portion of the house.127   
In response, the British Parliament revised the window tax in 1747 to specifically cover 
windows on buildings separate from the primary dwelling, including any “[k]itchen, [s]cullery, 
[b]uttery, [p]antry, [l]arder, [w]ash-house, [l]aundry, [b]ake house, [b]rewhouse, and [l]odging-
[r]oom, whether contiguous to, or disjoined from the [d]welling [h]ouse.”128  
 
119 See Stebbings, supra note 99, at 193. 
120 Id. 
121 Id. at 189. 
122 An Act for Granting to His Majesty an Aid and Contribution for the Prosecution of the War (1798), 38 
Geo. 3, c. 16, §§ 1, 10 [hereinafter the Triple Assessment]; see also DOWELL, supra note 42, at 87; STEBBINGS, supra 
note 84, at 5, 25; Likhovski, supra note 81, at 879. 
123 The Triple Assessment, supra note 122; see also Likhovski, supra note 81, at 875; ADAMS, supra note 11, 
at 351. 
124  See CHARLES MACFARLANE, THE COMPREHENSIVE HISTORY OF ENGLAND: CIVIL AND MILITARY, 
RELIGIOUS, INTELLECTUAL, AND SOCIAL, FROM THE EARLIEST PERIOD TO THE SUPPRESSION OF THE SEPOY REVOLT 
653 (1861). 
125 See NOBLE, supra note 49, at 31, 51; see also Andrew Burman, Blurring the Lines with Blind Windows, 
in GREENWICH VILLAGE FOR HISTORIC PRESERVATION (Dec. 23, 2011), https://gvshp.org/blog/2011/12/23/blurring-
the-lines-with-blind-windows/ [https://perma.cc/77YB-XNDL] (the 1845 Campbell House in Virginia, which has 4 
fake windows despite no window tax existing in Virginia at the time, implies that they were added merely for stylistic 
purposes).  
126 The British Window Tax Act, supra note 77; see also DOWELL, supra note 42, at 177. 
127 See DOWELL, supra note 42, at 173. 
128 The Duty on Inhabited Houses, 1778, 18 Geo 3 c. 26 (Eng.); The British Window Tax Act, supra note 77; 
Houses and Windows Duties Amendment Act, 1748, 21 Geo. 2 c. 10 §26 (Eng.). See DOWELL, supra note 42, at 94 
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The use of separate buildings also served as a strategy to reduce taxes under the property 
tax enacted following the window tax.129 The property tax was imposed on occupied houses but 
did not include warehouses, shops, unoccupied servants’ quarters or other buildings used for trade 
or businesses.130 The tax was imposed on any shops or warehouses if they were physically attached 
to the dwelling house.131 As a result, taxpayers moved work spaces into separate buildings in order 
to reduce tax.132  
C. Window Tax in the United States 
There is no known evidence that a tax specifically on windows was ever enacted in the 
United States. However, similar taxes were imposed historically. The Revenue Act of 1767, one 
of the Townshend Acts, imposed taxes on glass, lead and paint.133 As a result of the Act, imported 
glass became so expensive that using it for windows was a luxury that few colonists could 
afford.134 More impactful than the prohibitive price was the boycott of the importation of the taxed 
items in rebellion against the English imposition of taxes.135  For example, the 1767 Boston 
Nonimportation Agreement was a covenant signed by hundreds of Boston merchants to boycott 
British imports in the wake of the Townshend Acts.136 
The lack of imported glass to make windows made winters even more brutal, and colonists 
sometimes used oiled paper or mica as replacement for glass windows.137 Many colonists also 
started to experiment on ways to manufacture high-quality glass locally in order to be less 
dependent on imported glass. Glass-manufacturing factories began to spring up in Massachusetts, 
New York, Virginia and Pennsylvania.138 In Pittsburgh, green window glass, known as flint glass, 
was produced and still used by older homes today.139 The earliest glass windows produced in the 
colonies were small, often diamond shaped panes and leaded together in a pattern and then into 
the casement, known today as leaded windows.140 Because the colonists struggled to create larger 
 
(noting the law originally provided a 10% limit repairs for unoccupied houses and buildings while farm buildings 
were permitted 8%); Income and Property Taxes Act, 1806, 46 Geo. 3 c. 65 (Eng.) [hereinafter the 1806 Property Tax 
Act]. 
129 See id. at 178. 
130 The 1806 Property Tax Act, supra note 128. 
131 See DOWELL, supra note 42, at 180. 
132 An Act for Tax Management, 1803, 43 Geo. 3, c. 50 (Eng.); see also DOWELL, supra note 42, at 182. 
133 See Revenue Act of 1767, 7 Geo. 3 c. 46. The Act was one of the five Townshend Acts that impose tax 
on the colonies. The second of the Townshend Acts led to the Boston Tea Party, while another led to the Boston 
Massacre. See Kevin Schultz, HIST 85 (2010) (discussing the Townshend Acts and other historical events leading to 
the Boston Massacre). 
134 See HAROLD DONALDSON EBERLEIN, THE ARCHITECTURE OF COLONIAL AMERICA 248 (1915). 
135 See Glantz, supra note 83, at 28; see also JOHN RIDPATH, THE CONSTITUTION AND WASHINGTON’S 
PRESIDENCY 312 (1912); George Upham, Pre-Revolutionary Life and Thought in a Western New Hampshire Town, 
in 54(5) THE GRANITE MONTHLY: A MAG. OF LIT., HIST. AND STATE PROGRESS 199, 200 (1922). 
136  See T.H. Breen, "Baubles of Britain": The American and Consumer Revolutions of the Eighteenth 
Century, in 119 PAST AND PRESENT 73, 77, 91 (1988); see also Arthur M. Schlesinger, Politics, Propaganda, and the 
Philadelphia Press, 1767-1770, in 60(4) THE PENN. MAG. OF HIST. AND BIOGRAPHY 309, 318 (1936).   
137 See ALLEN NOBLE, VERNACULAR BUILDINGS: A GLOBAL SURVEY 180 (2013); see also Upham, supra note 
135, at 202. 
138 See RIDPATH, supra note 135, at 312.  
139 See id. 
140 EBERLEIN, supra note 134, at 249.  
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single panes of glass, the dimensions for window openings in that period were also smaller. It was 
not until late eighteenth century that residents began to desire larger windows for their houses.141 
D. The Window Tax in Ireland 
 The British imposed the Window Tax on Ireland in 1799 to help raise revenue for the 
Napoleonic wars.142 It was only imposed on households with seven or more windows.143 The taxes 
were oppressive for the Irish and were repealed for small farmhouses in 1823.144 Irish taxpayers 
used similar tax avoidance strategy or simply refused to pay.145 Of particular concern was that Irish 
windows were used not only for indoor lighting, but also for venting, due to the lack of chimneys 
which can be further traced back to the chimney tax.146 As a response to the window tax, members 
of the Irish Parliament and the Chancellor of Ireland argued that the taxes were too heavy and the 
Irish taxpayers could not afford them; they also expressed a concern over the potential harmful 
impact on health.147 The tax was eventually repealed after the war because of objections of the 
Irish Parliament.148 
E. The Windows and Doors Tax of France 
The France enacted a tax on both windows and doors in 1798 and repealed the tax in 
1926.149 One distinction between the British and the French window taxes was that the French tax 
rate was based on both the number and the size of the windows or doors, while the British tax rate 
was solely based on the number of windows150 Similar tax avoidance behaviors were observed in 
France as those observed in England. For example, a missionary in the French colony of Akaroa 
described how he would climb in and out of his “home” on his hands and knees in an attempt to 
minimize the size of windows and doors.151 Perhaps in response to the wide use of tax avoidance 
strategy, exemptions were enacted later for large tenement housing as well as for families with 
 
141 See id.  
142 See Dickson, supra note 65, at 58.  
143 See id. 
144 See STEPHEN DOWELL, DIRECT TAXES AND STAMP DUTIES 193 (1884). 
145 See 4 HENRY GRATTAN, THE SPEECHES OF THE RIGHT HONORABLE HENRY GRATTAN: IN THE IRISH, AND 
IN THE IMPERIAL PARLIAMENT 407, 409 (Longman, Hurst, Rees, Orme and Brown 1822).  
146 See Oates, supra note 77, at 11. 
147 See GRATTAN, supra note 145, at 407; see also Oates, supra note 77, at 11. 
148 See the Repeal of the Window and Hearth Tax in Ireland (1851), 3 Geo. 4 c. 82 & 54; see also Motion for 
the Repeal of the Window Tax in Ireland, 40 HCD cc. 126-148 (May 5, 1819); Oates, supra note 77, at 11; GRATTAN, 
supra note 145, at 407. 
149 See Chantal Stebbings, Consent and Constitutionality in Nineteenth-Century Taxation, in 3 STUDIES IN 
THE HISTORY OF TAX LAW 302 (John Tiley ed. 2009); see also Oates, supra note 77, at 11. 
150 Reports from His Majesty's Representatives Abroad Respecting Graduated Income Taxes in Foreign 
States: Presented to Both Houses of Parliament by Command of His Majesty August 1905, France No. 16, 143 ¶4 
(Great Britain. Parliament Sessional papers, 1905. Cd. 2587.); see also NOBLE, supra note 49, at 31. 
151 See T. LINDSAY BUCK, THE FRENCH AT AKAROA: AN ADVENTURE IN COLONIZATION 151-152 (2011). 
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more than 7 children. 152  Further, to avoid disproportionate tax burden, the tax would be 
apportioned in a collective amount by region, arrondissement, commune, and so forth.153 
Similar to the British, the French resented any imposition of tax that intruded into their 
privacy and therefore preferred taxes that were assessed by an objective standard and without the 
need to collect sensitive personal information.154 A tax on windows and doors arguably satisfies 
such a standard. However, similar to what was observed in England, French architects with an eye 
to taxation started to design buildings with smaller and fewer windows.155 The tax is often cited to 
explain the very small gable windows French settlers in Quebec used in their 
homes. 156 Additionally, residences for the poor were designed to have as few openings as 
possible.157 In extreme cases, entire houses in France were built without windows.158 
F. The Window and Door Tax in the Netherlands 
The tax on windows and doors was introduced to Netherlands by Napoleon. According to 
Alexander Gogel, the Minister of Finance appointed for the Netherlands, architectural changes 
were almost immediately observed after the tax was first imposed in 1810.159 Gogel himself sought 
a 25% reduction of the tax in an attempt to stop the changes he observed, stating the taxes were 
“irregular, indiscriminate taxes without guidelines [or] standards . . . and cause problems with 
determining everyone’s share in the level of taxation.” 160  According to him, windows were 
blocked up immediately to avoid the tax and palaces were built with few windows. Jean-Baptiste 
Say, a prominent contemporary French economist, recalled that as a teenager, he watched men 
hired by the owner of the building where he lived bricked over windows to avoid the tax.161 “Even 
today, in old Dutch cities and villages, houses with bricked up windows can still be found. 
Moreover, on the canals of Amsterdam there are city palaces from this period that have relatively 
few windows….”162 
V. TAX LAWS THAT AFFECT THE CONSTRUCTION OF BUILDINGS 
A. The Mansard Roof of France 
 
 
152 See EDWIN ROBERT ANDERSON SELIGMAN, THE INCOME TAX: A STUDY OF THE HISTORY, THEORY, AND 
PRACTICE OF INCOME TAXATION AT HOME AND ABROAD 276 (1914).  
153  See THOMAS PIKETTY, TOP INCOMES IN FRANCE IN THE 20TH CENTURY: INEQUALITY AND 
REDISTRIBUTION 1901-1998 (2018); see also J. Bouvier, Le système fiscal français. Ètude critique d'un immobilisme, 
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Haye: Mouton 1973).  
154 See Stebbings, supra note 149, at 302; see also Onno Ydema & Henk Vording, Dutch Tax Reforms in the 
Napoleonic Era, in 6 STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF TAX LAW 489 (John Tiley ed. 2013). 
155 See MICHAEL MOÏSSEY POSTAN & H. J. HABAKKUK, THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE: 
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HAVE FAILED 47 (1999). 
158 See A Business Man on Taxes, supra note 68. 
159 See Ydema, supra note 154, at 513. 
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During the reign of Napoleon, French property taxes were partially based on the number 
of floors a property has.163 The number of floors is counted based on all floors below the roofline 
(hence the name “roof tax”).164 In 1783, the city of Paris implemented a 20-meter (roughly 65 feet) 
maximum height on architectural structures, with a crucial caveat: the height of a building is 
measured up to the cornice line, leaving the roof zone above (the attic) unaffected by the limit.165  
The Mansard roof was initially designed by Francois Mansart, a French architect, in the 
Seventeenth century, but did not become popular until Napoleon’s roof tax was enacted.166 The 
Mansard roof is a flat roof, with hip sides that slope upwards on an angle. The top floor has enough 
roof space to be a living space.167 Because under the roof tax law, the top floor (above the roofline) 
was an attic and not counted as part of the tax base, taxpayers sought to maximize the habitable 
space in a dwelling while minimizing the roof tax through the use of Mansard Roofs.168 Eventually, 
the Mansard roof became recognized as a distinctive architectural style, independent of its previous 
use as a tax avoidance strategy.169 
The Mansard roof was called the “second empire” style in the United States and was 
especially popular from 1865 to 1895 for both private and public buildings.170 Architects in the 
United States found the Mansard roof reflective of European style artistically and used it both to 
create an urban atmosphere and to maximize living space through the top floor.171 As people 
moved west in the United States, the Mansard roof design spread west, resulting it its presence 
throughout the country.172 
B. The Brick Tax  
 
163 See National Association of Tax Administrators, Revenue Administration: 1987. Proceedings of the Fifty-
Fifth Annual Conference of National Association of Tax Administrators, 55, 152 (1987) [hereinafter NTA 1987]; see 
also Richard F. Dye & Richard W. England, Assessing the Theory and Practice of Land Value Taxation, in LINCOLN 
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Sept. 1984). 
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The British brick tax was a tax based on the number of bricks in a building, which was 
introduced by King George III in 1784 to help pay for the war against colonial America.173  Bricks 
were initially taxed at 4 shillings per a thousand bricks, with almost no exemptions.174  
The brick tax had several unintended effects on popular architecture.175 First, bricks were 
essentially eliminated as a building material in rural areas following the enactment of the brick 
tax.176 Second, brick manufacturers increased the size of bricks manufactured, often doubling their 
size, so that less bricks were needed for the same building.177 The British government responded 
by limiting a maximum size of a brick to that of a typical brick before the enactment of the brick 
tax.178 Tax rate was increased if a brick exceeded the maximum size limit.179 Also, alternative 
materials, such as wood or weatherboards, received more popularity in home construction, despite 
being considered as inferior to bricks.180 Some builders turned to stone despite it being more 
expensive.181  
Houses built with larger bricks or with alternative materials to bricks today are reminiscent 
of the brick tax that has long been repealed. One observer noted that “[t]he taxes on building 
materials and windows were perceived as materially damaging to architectural style and 
beauty.” 182  Joseph Wilkes of Measham, Leicestershire became well-known for 
his “Jumb” or “Gob” bricks.183 His bricks, almost double in size of a normal brick, has become an 
icon of his time.184  
The tax was devastating to the brick industry and was detrimental to industrial 
development. Numerous small brick producers went out of business, after being forced to sell their 
inventory to pay the tax.185 The tax was abolished in 1850.186 Despite repealing the tax, the British 
government did not take any corrective actions to remedy the damage caused by the tax.187 The 
tax was intended to raise revenue and instead damaged an industry and distorted the architectural 
design and aesthetics of buildings.   
 
173 Duties on Bricks and Tiles (1784), 24 Geo. 3, c. 24, §1 (Eng.); see R.W. BRUNSKILL, HOUSES AND 
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174 See BARRY BRIDGWOOD & LINDSAY LENNIE, HISTORY, PERFORMANCE AND CONSERVATION 27 (2013). 
175 See id. 
176 See id. at 51. 
177 See DOWELL, supra note 42, at 390-391. 
178 The Excise Act (1805), 45 Geo. III c. 30 (Eng.). 
179 See Stebbings, supra note 99, at 181.  
180 See id. at 183, 191. 
181 Brick Making Act (1725), 12 Geo. 1, c. 85 (Eng.); see also HORACE WALLPOLE, 2 MEMOIRS OF THE REIGN 
OF KING GEORGE II 178 (1846) (claiming he tried to convince the King to tax stone instead, but was rebuffed); see 
also Stebbings, supra note 99, at 181. 
182  Id. at 189. 
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in Particular, to the County of Norfolk, 13 CONSTR. HIST. 850, 850 n. 80 (1997); see also J.M. MCCOMISH, YORK 
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43 (2015). 
184 MCCOMISH, supra note 183, at 43. 
185 See Lucas, supra note 183, at 869-70.  
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C. The British Wallpaper Tax188 
In the early 1700’s, wallpaper became more popular in England as its advantages over 
tapestries became clear. Queen Anne enacted a tax on wallpaper in Great Britain in 1712 as a tax 
on luxury items.189 Wallpaper was taxed if it had patterns or was printed or painted. Until the mid-
1800’s, wallpaper in England was almost exclusively hand painted, hand stenciled or embossed 
by talented workers.190 The tax was finally repealed in 1836.191  
There were four major issues with the English wallpaper tax. First, although the tax was 
imposed on locally manufactured wallpaper, no equivalent tax was imposed on imported wallpaper 
until much later. This disparate tax treatment significantly disadvantaged England’s otherwise 
booming wallpaper industry.192 Second, the government’s attempt to maximize revenue under the 
tax led to inefficiency and waste, such as preventing the use of machinery in wallpaper production 
or requiring wallpaper to be cut into smaller pieces so that more pieces were subject to tax.193 
Consumers, however, generally preferred larger or whole pieces of wallpaper to smaller ones.194 
Third, foreign consumers of exported wallpaper from England were not subject to the tax, while 
domestic consumers were subject to the tax.195 Fourth, various tax avoidance strategies, such as 
hiring artisans to directly paint on plain paper already attached to the wall, or just painting on the 
plain plaster, became widely used.196  
To deter the use of such tax avoidance strategies, British government imposed a tax on the 
use of plain paper as wallpaper to be painted later on.197  Regardless, such “half self-made” 
wallpaper still cost less than commercially manufactured wallpaper. Ireland also enacted a 
wallpaper tax at the same time, but it adopted a more aggressive anti-avoidance rule by making it 
illegal to hang plain paper to be painted and used as wallpaper. The law also permitted aggressive 
and potentially disruptive enforcement, such as government inspection of the interior of private 
houses without notice.198 
Interior architectural decoration grew in popularity as a trade as wallpaper design became 
an art form, either imported or stenciled after hanging.199 Ideally, “[w]all papers should be printed 
 
188 See Owen W. Davis, Friends in Council, Wall Papers, in THE BRITISH ARCHITECTURE 291 (1882) 
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193 See id. at 90. 
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in lengths . . . from 6 to 12 feet.”200 A wallpaper machine was invented to accommodate this length 
and facilitate production201 Despite these innovations, however, British wallpaper was cut into 
smaller sizes to accommodate the higher tax burden on larger sheets.202 Regrettably, the tax on 
domestically created wallpaper stifled development of the industry in Great Britain.203 The tax was 
repealed in 1836, coinciding with the development of steam making machinery that mass-produced 
wallpaper at a significantly lower cost.204  
The tax on wallpaper failed to raise the anticipated revenue, and instead disrupted the 
English wallpaper industry, and simultaneously distorted the behavior of buyers, encouraging 
alternative architecture designs such as hand painting and stenciling to avoid taxes.205 
D. Japanese Hidden Stairs  
In the Eighth century, Japan imposed a tax on multi-story buildings. 206  The central 
government, the Bakufu, had power over the local governments and charged each village with 
collecting and paying the tax through leaders.207 The Bakufu did not impose consistent tax rates 
or regulations, delegating it to the village leaders, unless the tax rates were expressly in conflict 
with rules of the Bakufu.208 Komononari taxes were broad and included taxes on features that 
indicated wealth, such a second story of a houses.209 Further, during this time period, the tax burden 
fell mainly on farmers, who, with the village leaders, became resentful of wealthy merchants and 
would “[extort] taxes and loans from merchants” motivating some to disguise the square footage 
of a house.210 
Japanese artisans created stair chests called kaidan-tansu which many speculate was in 
response to these taxes, disguising two story homes as one story.211 They were intricate chests used 
as armoires or general storage as well as stairs that could be rolled in place for use as a staircase, 
or rolled out of sight if a tax accessor visited.212 Some kaidan- tansu could be disassembled to 
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56, 62 (1928). 
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further disguise it from the tax collector while other versions would be moved elsewhere in the 
home and appear as a bookcase or closet.213 
VI. TAXES AND SKINNY HOUSES 
A.  The Netherlands Frontage Tax 
Among the unique characteristics of Amsterdam’s architecture are the extremely narrow 
buildings,214 particularly those along the Dutch canal.215 In the early 17th century, Amsterdam was 
in its Golden Age, and the city was experiencing great expansion. Within 75 years, the population 
increased from 54,000 to 200,000. Due to the lack of space, particularly along the canal, the city 
of Amsterdam enacted a tax on houses based on the width of their frontage. 216 To reduce liability 
under the new tax, canal houses were built strikingly narrow, tall but deep so that it could provide 
more living space behind the frontage.217 Those houses also had large windows to improve indoor 
lighting and to transport items in and out of the house through the pulley system, which were 
necessary given the unique physical structure of those houses. Ironically, when Napoleon came to 
power and imposed the French tax structure, taxes were imposed based on the size of the windows 
on the front of the houses. The Singel 166 building in Amsterdam is perhaps the narrowest building 
in the city: it is less than six feet wide, only slightly wider than the front door. 218  
Interestingly, since the tax made wider houses significantly more expensive, building a 
house with wide frontage became a new symbol of power and wealth. For example, wealthy 
merchants would sometimes buy two adjacent plots of land to build “city palaces” along the canal. 
The “Golden Bend” (Gouden Bocht) of the Herengracht, one of the major canals in Amsterdam, 
was known as the wealthiest section of the city, with wide houses built on several adjacent lots.219  
The so-called “Dutch staircase” is another architectural change that accommodated houses 
with extremely narrow frontage.220 Such staircases were designed to be extremely steep and spiral 
to fit within the narrow space.221 They were so steep that they were unfit for carrying items up and 
down the building, necessitating more architectural innovations.222 The crane and pulley system 
was the answer. Such system featured a large hook permanently attached to the roof of the building. 
To bring items to the upper floors, a rope was put through the hook, creating the pulley that allowed 
lifting of heavy items. Once the items were lifted to the target level, they could be brought in 
 
213 See The Home Office, TORONTO STAR, Jan. 15, 2004, at HO 3; see also Christine Brun, East and West 
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through the large windows, another architectural feature mentioned earlier that specifically 
accommodated the narrow frontage design. 223  
B. The Frontage Tax in Charleston, South Carolina 
Because of a tax on frontage, many houses in Charleston, SC feature narrow frontage, 
producing a distinctive architectural building design representative of the city, known as a 
Charleston Single.224These characteristic residences are often several floors high and are built deep 
into the lot.225 The houses usually also have two substantial, upper and lower side porches called 
piazzas, which are often used as outside rooms.226 Such houses remained popular throughout the 
18th Century and for most of the 19th Century, but abruptly disappeared after the 1890s.227 At its 
peak, the so-called Charleston Single House dominated the city with around 4,000 in existence.228 
Today that figure is estimated to be 2,700.229  
This unique architectural style coincided with a tax based on the frontage of buildings in 
the 18th and 19th century.230 Only the frontage facing the street was subject to the tax, which did 
not include the side porches. 231  To reduce liability under the tax, homeowners tried to minimize 
the building frontage while increasing its height and depth.232  
C. Japan’s Property and Inheritance Taxes 
In Japan, three separate taxes: the frontage tax, the property tax on farmland and the 
inheritance tax, have historically led to uniquely small houses. The frontage tax was enacted to 
raise revenue and shift some of the tax burden from farmers to merchants and artisans.233 Rather 
than producing revenue, the tax resulted in very narrow, deep buildings with a width of rarely 
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exceeding six meters.234 The front, first floor was commonly used as a shop or marketplace while 
the back and upper floors were used as living quarters.235  
The property tax on farms was almost negligible, motivated by a policy to encourage 
agriculture and reduce the financial burden on working farmers.236 However, because of the low 
property tax, there was little incentive to sell or improve the land because the cost of holding the 
land unused was minimal whereas there were immediate tax consequences if the land was sold.237 
As a result, many farm owners would leave the land idle, rather than finding a more productive or 
efficient use for it.238 
As a response to the consolidation and unproductive use of farm land, the inheritance tax 
on the same property was set extremely high to encourage sale and reduce the deadhand control of 
large real estates. 239 However, the inheritance tax was reduced as the number of heirs increased, 
since a larger number of heirs served to break up the estate and more efficient use of the property.240 
As a result, land inherited in Japan was progressively divided into smaller pieces.241 Because the 
tax was based on both the size of the estate and the number of statutory heirs under the civil code,242 
it was beneficial to have as many heirs as possible, even if they were not named in the will.243 For 
example, testators sought to adopt grandchildren, nephews and nieces to make them statutory heirs. 
244  
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The joint effect of the property and the inheritance taxes often resulted in destroying family 
farms, as farmers decided whether to sell their farms during their lifetime or to leave the farms to 
their heirs, breaking it into smaller pieces in the process. Either way, the family farm was lost.  
D. Vietnamese Tube Houses 
Vietnamese “tube houses” are very narrow houses typically built up to five floors. The 
typical tube house was originally a building with shops on the first floor and living spaces above. 
As generations of the family grew, floors would be added.245 The architectural design coincided 
with a tax based on the frontage of the buildings.246 These houses could be as narrow as two meters 
and as long as 70 meters.247 Tube houses were first built in the “Old City” (Hanoi) during the Le 
Dynasty, from 1428 to 1788.248 To receive more natural light, despite the narrowness, such houses 
often had multiple courtyards along the longer side. The traditional tube house construction 
continued until the end of the 19th century.249 
Despite the fact that tube houses were designed to reduce the tax burden, these houses have 
become a fundamental part of Vietnam’s architecture.250 They are often very colorful, as well as 
architectural feats, with staircases, balconies, and roof decks despite their narrowness. 251 
Recognizing its independent architectural value, UNESCO-funded organizations have restored 
some tube houses as representatives of the 19th century houses in the Old City.   
E. New Orleans 
The traditional New Orleans “shotgun houses” were very narrow, often only one room 
wide, but long and deep into the lot.252 The houses received their names because it would be easy 
to fire a shotgun from the front door straight into the back since the house was so long and 
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narrow.253 Despite the possibility that non-tax factors such as lot size or the need for cooling might 
have motivated the design,254 the New Orleans Bar Association has taken the position that the 
shotgun houses were probably used to avoid taxes.255  
Some evidence also indicated that the city of New Orleans countered the use of shotgun 
houses with a tax calculated based on the number of hallways or closets in the building.256 There 
is also evidence that taxpayers responded to the new tax by minimizing the number of hallways 
and closets.257 However, the actual reason for such architectural design remains uncertain and 
debatable. 
VII. THE DIRECT TAX OF 1798 AND ITS IMPACTS ON AMERICAN ARCHITECTURE 
 In the early days of the United States, despite the rarity of federal taxes, the main source of 
revenue for the federal government was real property taxes.258 The federal government usually 
apportioned the burden of such taxes among the states and allowed each state to administer its own 
tax system. This could lead to different enforcement regime in each state. For example, in New 
Jersey, although the land itself has independent economic value, taxes generally applied only to 
land with buildings or other improvements.259  Consequently, property owners reduced their tax 
liabilities by separating improved from unimproved parcels, in order to reduce the value of the 
parcels with improvements and thus subject to tax. 260  As another example, New Hampshire 
enacted a law that made each individual property holder in a community jointly and severally liable 
for the entire property tax liability of that community.261 This eased the burden of accounting on 
the state before it could sue and seize properties of an individual for tax delinquency. The unlucky 
individual whose properties were seized could then sue their neighbors for contribution.262 
A. The Direct Tax of 1798 
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The Direct Tax of 1798 was imposed on land, residential houses and slaves.263 The Federal 
government sought to raise $2 million in anticipation of an upcoming war with France.264 Congress 
divided the $2 million total among the states and required that each state assess the tax.  
Alexander Hamilton, the former Secretary of the Treasury, favored a tax on houses over 
land, believing houses could be valued more accurately and were a better measurement of taxpayer 
wealth, using indicators like the number of rooms, wallpaper and other signs of lavishness. A tax 
on houses also ensured that citizens residing in urban and rural areas shared the tax burden rather 
than for the tax to disproportionately affect taxpayers such as farmers.265 Oliver Wolcott, then 
Secretary of the Treasury, was against enacting any tax at all, but if one was enacted, he preferred 
a land tax, believing that residences were merely a cost of living whereas farm land was a source 
of income and the tax would be merely a cost of producing that income. Alternatively, he proposed 
a house tax that would initially exempt the houses of farmers and their laborers.266 Ultimately, the 
tax was a combination of both. 267 Sixty-five percent of the tax was to be on dwellings, with the 
remainder of the tax imposed on land and slaves.268 
The tax assessed on the dwellings was based on such factors as the number of windows, 
the building materials used, the number of floors, and the dimension of any outhouse.269 The tax 
was progressive, intended to tax the wealthy at a higher rate, but the progressivity only applied to 
dwellings; land and slaves were taxed at fixed rates.270 It had harsh results for farmers because 
they often did not have liquid asset such as cash and were at risk of foreclosure if they were unable 
to pay the tax.271  
The Direct Tax of 1798 was criticized by many and was unpopular with the public, 
triggering memories of the despised hearth taxes and window taxes imposed on many citizens in 
their former countries.272 For example, John Williams from New York remarked before the House 
of Representatives that a land tax would penalize owners of large tracts of land such as farmers in 
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favor of urban residents.273 Some argued that the tax burdened homeowners and farmers who 
improved or cultivated their land but benefited land speculators.274 One of the strongest objections 
to the Direct Tax of 1798 was that it directed accessors to count the number of windows in a 
dwelling.275It alarmed citizens that a window tax similar to the taxes imposed in Europe had 
followed them to their new country.276 In truth however, there was not a tax on windows and they 
were not part of the assessment. Rather, accessors were asked to count the windows should a 
window tax be enacted in the future.277  
Residents in Pennsylvania had strong objections to the tax in part because of the large 
German population who were still resentful of the hearth tax imposed in Germany.278 There was 
an active resistance to the tax resulting in the “Fries Rebellion.”279 The community prevented 
accessors from doing their jobs by blocking accessors from completing their assessments and 
throwing scalding hot water on any accessors who came close to their homes.280 Residents in 
Pennsylvania would also prevent foreclosures for non-payment of the tax by blocking roads.281  
B. Dutch Colonial Architecture 
The Dutch Colonial house is a famous example of architecture developed to avoid taxes 
imposed by the Direct Tax of 1798.282 A Dutch Colonial house typically has a gambrel roof, 
sometimes with flared eaves, and frequently has dormers.283 The amount of taxes under the Direct 
Tax of 1798 was partially determined by the number of floors, and, according to the Federal Direct 
Tax Records of 1798, gambrel-roofed houses were treated as having only one floor because the 
upper floor under the gambrel roof was considered an attic.284 A Dutch Colonial house helped to 
minimize taxes and at the same time had a living space equivalent to that of a two-floor building 
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since gambrel roofs allowed the top floor to be used as a living space.285 Commentators stated that 
“[o]f all of the types of domestic architecture . . . modified during the Colonial period, none more 
generally commends itself to the favourable consideration of the modern home builder than the 
Dutch Colonial.”286 
C. The Saltbox Houses 
“Saltbox houses” are traditional New England style houses, characterized by a wooden 
frame house with a clapboard exterior.287 The front of the house appears to be a two-story house, 
while the back roofline slopes steeply down allowing for smaller space in the back.288 Houses with 
this slanted shape date back to the colonial New England in 1650 when they were classified as a 
single-story house for tax purposes under a tax imposed by Queen Anne despite allowing for larger 
living space.289 The saltbox house continued in popularity as it was classified as a single story 
house under the Direct Tax of 1798 as well  
Historically, one of the most famous Saltbox houses was the birthplace of John Adams, the 
second President of the United States. The place now belongs to a National Historic Park in 
Massachusetts. 
VIII. ARCHITECTURAL CHANGES FROM LAND TAXES VERSUS BUILDING TAXES 
A.  Tax Laws that Discourage New Improvements and Buildings 
Property taxes based on the value of land improvements or buildings can discourage new 
improvements and buildings.290 Property owners, particularly speculators, might be incentivized 
to allow their properties to fall into disrepair or to underutilize their properties in order to lower 
the tax liabilities.291 Further, such taxes may encourage speculators to subdivide their land into 
smaller, developed or undeveloped parcels, in order to minimize the value of undeveloped 
parcels.292 
  As evidence of the depressing effect on land improvement efforts, Pennsylvania enacted a 
law in 1913, requiring the cities of Pittsburgh and Scranton to assess buildings at a lower rate than 
land.293 It was an experiment to see if the change in taxes affected the development and use of 
land.294 Not surprisingly, following the law’s enactment, the volume of building construction 
increased, estimated by the number of new building permits issued. This in turn caused the market 
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price of undeveloped land to fall and made land speculation less economically attractive.295 
Obviously, the new law also reduced the tax burden on homeowners.296 Following the experiment, 
the city of Pittsburgh imposed an increased tax on the value of land itself, which further encouraged 
residential and commercial building construction.297 
 Australia and Canada also historically modified their land tax policies to try to encourage 
the development of architecture and construction.298 Australia in 1906 and Western Canada in 
1892 both imposed taxes either on the value of land itself, or on the value of land plus the value of 
improvements and buildings with the latter at a reduced rate.299 In both cases, the result was an 
increase in the volume of new building construction.300 Australia in particular, after the revision 
of the law, there was evidence that areas in economic disrepair were revitalized with new 
construction projects.301 
B. Russian Tax on Plowed Land 
 As another example, there was evidence that a tax on plowed farm land in Russia during 
the Seventeenth century led to underdeveloped land.302 Since the tax was imposed on plowed land 
only, taxpayers were incentivized to leave their land uncared. Land was used unproductively and 
families gave up farming.303   
In addition, since the tax was also imposed on a one-dwelling-one-tax basis, many people 
chose to live together and share a common dwelling to minimize tax. This contributed to the 
growth of duplexes and triplexes.304  
 In response, tax collectors began to consider each door that gave access to the outside as 
a separate household.305 Families using shared dwelling in turn began to board up additional 
doors.306 Eventually, Peter the Great revised the tax system, eliminating the tax on plowed land, 
and instating a poll tax on males instead.307 
IX. TAX AND ECO-FRIENDLY BUILDING 
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Taxes are frequently used as inducement for decisions regarding development and 
conservation. 308  However, tax laws intended to change behaviors concerning environmental 
protection might lead to unintended architectural changes, sometimes even to the detriment of the 
environment.309  
A. Inaccurate Proxy for “Eco-friendly”: The LEED Standard 
 Many jurisdictions use the LEED standard as a standard for certain favorable tax treatments 
in order to incentivize private research and development of eco-friendly buildings. 310  The 
Leadership in Energy and Environmental Design (LEED) program was developed by the U.S. 
Green Building Council, a non-profit organization.311 The LEED standard evaluates a building for 
environmental sustainability in six areas: (1) location and sitting, (2) water efficiency, (3) energy 
and atmosphere, (4) materials and resources, (5) indoor environmental quality, and (6) innovation 
and design.312 Earning points under the standard awards certificates of different levels which are 
used by many jurisdictions to determine the amount of tax credits a taxpayer is entitled to for eco-
friendly initiatives.  
However, the LEED standard itself is often exploited. For example, critics of LEED 
standard argue that the average certified building increases the need for automobiles by 137%.313 
Since LEED projects are usually located far from city centers,314 they sometimes necessitate 
additional automobile use, but automobile use associated with the project is not factored into the 
LEED standard.315 In addition, developers often choose the cheapest ways to accumulate points, 
like using bamboo flooring or including bike racks, but these measures might not contribute a lot 
to environmental sustainability.316 It is contended that one quarter of LEED certified buildings do 
not meet the energy saving goals.317 
B. Competing Interests: The Solar Projects 
Despite the wide use of tax incentives for the use and development of solar technology,318 
solar panels and solar farms are often deemed aesthetically unappealing and undesirable (like 
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nuisance).319 As an example, California enacted a law preventing local governments from denying 
permits for solar technology based exclusively on aesthetic concern and allowing denials only for 
safety or public health reasons.320 
X. CONCLUSION 
Although the primary goal of a tax is to raise revenue, there are times when it is used to 
induce certain behaviors or actions. There are also times when tax laws are enacted solely to induce 
certain behaviors. Often, a tax distorts taxpayer behaviors beyond their expectations, sometimes 
in direct contravention of what the law was enacted to incentivize. 
Much of my previous scholarship has explored the same phenomenon with a focus on 
corporate tax. This Article serves as an illustration and proof of the distortion that results when tax 
laws are designed to target a class of people or action as a proxy for something else. Architecture 
is the perfect example though which such distortion can be viewed directly and intuitively: it is 
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